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CHEMICAL PROSPECTING, BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Demandfor ChemicalProspecting
We are entering an era that has been termed as a "green revolution" in

which novel chemical compounds extracted from natural sources will
dramatically improve our quality of life by revolutionizing health and
agriculture.2 This era will also be marked by what some feel is the greatest
loss in human history - the extinction of many of the species that could fuel
this green revolution?
Scientists estimate that there are between 5 and 30 million species of
living organisms on Earth.4 About half of these species are located in tropical
rain forests, which collectively constitute a mere 7% of the Earth's land
surface.' These forests are quickly being converted to other land uses, and as

2 John

Vidal, The Gene Rush, TORONTO STAR, July 10, 1993, atD6.

Harvard biologist and conservationist Edward 0. Wilson said in 1980 that "the
worst thing that can happen... is not energy depletion, economic collapse, limited
nuclear war, or conquest by a totalitarian government. As terrible as these
catastrophes would be for us, they can be repaired within a few generations. The one
process ongoing in the 1980s that will take millions of years to correct is the loss of
genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats. This is the folly
our descendents are least likely to forgive us." quoted in PAUL and ANNE EHRLiCH,
ExTINcION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES

3 (1981).

4
See Edward 0. Wilson, The Current State of Biological Diversity, in
BIoDwEmsrry, 5 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988). Of these, only about 1.4 million species
have actually been described. Id.
5 Id. at8.
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they disappear,
so does the biological diversity (biodiversity) that they
6
contain.
Biodiversity is usually defined as "the total of genes, species and
ecosystems on Earth" or some more elaborate version of this definition.7
Non-biological definitions of biodiversity are rare, however; possibly
reflecting the public's perception of biodiversity as something which exists
apart from man's use. Rather than a scientific unit, biodiversity can
alternatively be seen as an exploitable resource; just as gold, for example, can
be seen as both a chemical element and as a valuable metal which has many
aesthetic and productive uses.
Speaking of biodiversity as "living,
exploitable, renewable resources" helps to highlight the ample economic value

One estimate figures that roughly 1%of the biome, all living organisms on the
Earth, is being destroyed each year, with an additional 1%being severly degraded,
leading to the extinction of as many as 10,000 species each year. See Norman Myers,
Tropical forests and their species: Going, Going... ?, in BIODIVERSITY, 29, 30
(E.O. Wilson ed., 1988). Another source estimates that about 25% of all species
could be lost in the next several decades. This source also notes that extinction is a
natural process, but that the current anthropogenic extinction rate is 1,000 times the
natural rate of extinction. See Peter H. Raven, Our Diminishing Tropical Forests, in
BIoDrvERsrrY, 121 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
6

' See JEFFREY A. MCNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BIOLoGIcAL
DIVERsrrY, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
World Resources Institute, Conservation International, World Wild life Fund-US and

the World Bank I1 (1990). The UNCED Convention on Biological Diversity defines
biological di versity as "the variability among living organisms from all sources
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the

ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species,
between species and of ecosystems." art. 2, 311. L. M 818 (1992).
' The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (JUCN)
has defined biodiversity as simply "living resources" in IUCN, World Conservation
Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development, Gland,
Switzerland: IUCN (1980). The UNCED Convention on Biological Diversity
distinguishes "bio logical diversity" from "biological resources," see art. 2, 31 I.L.M.

818 (1992).
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of biodiversity and its potential consumptive and transformative uses.9
Biodiversity has received a great deal of attention in recent years as a vast
resource in the search for new and useful pharmaceutical products.'0 Plants
and plant extracts have been used throughout history for their medicinal
applications. Today, developing countries rely on plant- derived medicines for
85% of their health care needs." In the U.S., it is estimated that 25% of all
prescription drugs dispensed from community pharmacies contain chemicals

' There is abundant literature on the economic value and uses of biodiversity,
including pharmaceutical use: see Norman R. Farnsworth, ScreeningPlantsforNew
Medicines,in BIODIVERSITY, 83 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988); see also Marjory L.
Oldfield, The Value ofConservingGenetic Resoures, Washington: U.S. Department

of Interior, Na tional Park Service (1984); agriculture: Hugh H. Iltis, Serendipity in
the Exploration of Biodiversity: What Good Are Weedy Tomatoes?, in
BIODIVERSrrY, 98 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988); Mark J. Plotkin, The Outlookfor New
AgriculturalandIndustrialProductsfrom the Tropics, in BiODIvERsITY, Chap. 11
(E.O. Wilson ed., 1988); and other utilitarian benefits; NORMAN MYERS, THE

ANEwLOOK ATTHE PROBLEM OF DISAPPEARING SPECIES, (1979). For
a discussion of the non-utilitarian, aesthetic, ethical and philosophical value of
biodiversity, see THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES: THE VALUE OF BIOLOoIcAL
DIVERSITY, (Bryan G. Norton, ed., 1986) and BRYAN G.NORTON, WHY PRESERVE
NATURAL VARIETY? (1987).
" Probably the most widely publicized pharmaceutical discovery from a natural
source is the alkaloids vincris tine and vinblastine which were extracted from the
Madigascar rosy periwinkle and have provided an effective cure for Hodgkin's disease
and acute lymphocytic leukemia. The value of this discovery is estimated at $200
million a year. An other remarkable discovery is cyclosporine which was extracted
from a Norwegian fungus and is used as the principal immunosupressent in organ
transplant operations. Edward Wilson states that "millions of years of testing by
natural se lection have made organisms chemists of superhuman skill, champions at
defeating most of the kinds of biological problems that undermine human health." See
EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSr Y OF LIFE, at 320 (1992).
" This figure is for medicinal products directly extracted from plants. N.L.
Famsworth , et al., Medicinal Plants in Therapy, 63 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
SINKINGARK:

ORGANIZATION

695 (1985).
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directly extracted from plants. 2 All of these chemicals are derived from a
mere 90 species of plants; the rest of the 250,000+ species of higher plants on
Earth are untapped for their potential medicinal value. 3
In agriculture, genetic discoveries have dramatically improved many crop
varieties. The production of corn has been revolutionized by the discovery of
a species of perennial maize that is immune to two serious viral diseases
affecting its cultivated relative. 4 The benefits of a perennial corn crop would
dramatically increase the productivity of corn growers and help to feed more
people less expensively throughout the world. The potential applications of
chemical prospecting and biotechnology to agriculture, as well as to industry,
are almost limitless, making biodiversity our greatest natural resource.
The vast resource of biodiversity is generally perceived as a public good.
As such, it is seen as indivisible, with a constant amount of public benefit
available to all, independent of any single person's consumption. As a public
good, biodiversity is also seen as nonexcludable, with no one individual being
able to prevent others from consuming this resource. Because one can
consume as much biodiversity as one wishes without being excluded by others,
there is little incentive to contribute to the conservation of biodiversity. When
contributions are made to the conservation of biodiversity by one person,
another can merely take a "free ride" on this contribution without having to
contribute themselves. The incentive is to wait around for others to pay for
what you consume and the result is that the conservation of biodiversity is
underprovided and inefficient. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as
"market failure."
A market for biodiversity can and does exist. The effectiveness of this

'2 Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 83. Farnsworth presents a chart listing all 119 pure
chemical substances ex tracted from higher plants that he has identified as in common
use throughout the world. Forty six of these have never been used in the U.S. See id.
at 84.
13 Id at 92. Estimates place the number of species of higher plants between 250,000
and 750,000. Probably the most extensive search for medicinal chemicals was
conducted by the National Cancer Institute in the U.S. which has screened 35,000 of
these species for potential anti-cancer properties. Id.
14 See Oldfield, supra note 8.
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market depends on the degree of protection afforded to property rights in
biodiversity. One of the most effective ways of establishing property rights
in biodiversity is the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the
genetic, chemical and biological materials that constitute biodiversity. "[I]f
those who control a habitat hold proprietary rights to develop its biological
resources, then they have a means for obtaining economic benefits from those
resources, and, consequently, an incentive to conserve rather than destroy
them.""
Chemical prospecting has emerged as a means of capturing the value of
biodiversity. Dr. Thomas Eisner of Cornell University coined the term
"chemical prospecting" and defined it as "the search for new medicinals,
agrochemicals, and other substances of use from animal, plant, and microbial
sources."' 6 In order to capitalize on the fruits of chemical prospecting, large
investments in research and development must be made to produce marketable
products. Such investments will not be made, however, unless they can be
protected and the company sowing the seeds can also reap the harvest.
Thus, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies will be unable and
unwilling to establish contracts for chemical prospecting without adequate
protection of their IPRs in any products that result from that process. 7 When
IPRs are inadequately protected, grave financial consequences are suffered by

'5

Michael A. Gollin, An IntellectualPropertyRights FrameworkforBiodiversity

Prospecting, in BIoDIvERsITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 130 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993).
16

Thomas Eisner, ChemicalProspecting,Abstract of a talk given at the U.S.

Economic Opportunities in Global Environmental Agreements Conference,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., March 6-7, 1992. The term "chemical
prospecting" probably first appeared in Thomas Eisner, Prospectingfor Nature's

Chemical Riches, 6(2) Is SUES IN Sci. & TECH. 31 (1989).
17 Elissa Blum in her article states that R. Wilder, in a personal communication on
Oct. 30, 1992, told the au thor of an article in Environment magazine that "... [the
biotech industry] depends upon having strong intellectual prop erty protection to
develop new technologies.., and, once it's developed, to transfer it or to otherwise
make use of it." Elissa Blum, Conservation Profitable: A Case Study of the
MerckIVNBio Agreement, 35(4) ENv'T 17, 44.
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the owner of the IPRs. Besides losing much of the value of the initial
investment made to produce a marketable product, companies lose royalties
and sales of the product abroad or for export abroad. Profits are also lost to
piracy when foreign corporations sell counterfeit products abroad or import the
illicit products into the U.S. 18 Thus, the international protection of IPRs is a
matter of critical importance to U.S. corporations, whether seeking chemical
prospecting opportunities or any other market. This became evident when the
protection of biotechnology patent rights was a major barrier to U.S.
ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 9
Where international and domestic protection of IPRs is inadequate, there
is an alternative. Pseudo--IPRs can be established by creating a contract that
internalizes the external effects of a lack of IPR protection.2 ° Such a contract
was concluded in 1991 by Costa Rica's National Biodiversity Institute

"' Some sources estimate this loss at $25 billion annually, or more. Solomon F.
Balraj, Note, GeneralAgree ment on Tariffs andTrade: The Effect ofthe Uruguay
Round MultilateralTrade Negotiations on U.S. Intellectual PropertyRights, 24
CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 63, 66 (1992).
1' Timothy Wirth, the State Department's counselor for global affairs was quoted as
saying that "the Clinton administration will have to convince the Senate that
biotechnology patent rights will be protected before the Senate con sents to ratification
of the biodiversity treaty." Wirth Says Testfor IPR Protections Will be Ratification
ofBiodiversity Pact, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1530 (Sept. 15, 1993). See also,
PTO,Biotech GroupExplain Objections to EarthSummit's BiodiversityTreaty, 44
Pat Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 120 which argues that the U.S.'s refusal to sign
the biodiversity treaty was influenced by the opposition of the Patent and Trademark
Office which saw the treaty as po tentially undermining the U.S. efforts in the Uruguay
round of the GATT negotiations to secure greater international pro tection of
intellectual property. When the U.S. signed the treaty in May, 1992, it noted that it
finds the provisions for protection of intellectual property rights to be "unsatisfactory."
United States: Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme
Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992).
" Ronald Coase suggested that negotiation among affected parties can internalize the
costs of externalities if the transaction costs are low enough. Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem ofSocial Cost, 4 J. L. &ECON. I (1960).
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(InstitutoNacional de Biodiversidad(INBio)) and Merck & Co., Ltd., the
world's largest pharmaceutical firm, achieving what neither international nor
domestic law had been able to do- protect property rights, development
concerns and biodiversity, all at the same time.2

B. The Merck/INBio Agreement
This contract - the most widely publicized and successful chemical
prospecting agreement concluded to date - provided Merck with access to
chemical extracts and other biological materials collected by INBio for drug
screening and other research, in exchange for over $1 million paid in advance
to INBio as well as an agreement to pay royalties on all commercial drugs and
products developed by Merck from research facilitated by NBio.' In
addition, INBio agreed to dedicate 50% of all royalties received from Merck,
and 10% of its budget, to conservation of the wildlands that are used for its
chemical prospecting, and Merck agreed to train INBio scientists and
parataxonomists.
The Merck/INBio agreement was finalized at a strategic time - during
the final rounds of negotiations at the "Earth Summit" and the Convention on
Biological Diversity. At the time, there were no real precedents to the
agreement that paralleled its scope, purpose, formality and commitment to
conservation. Yet, at the same time, over 150 nations were agreeing to
develop national legislation and policy to encourage just such agreements. A
model would be highly useful and was desperately needed and the
MercklINBio agreement played just this role, with the world-wide media
bringing this timely and groundbreaking partnership to people's attention.
Several other nations were, at the same time, working on similar agreements,
and the Merck/INBio agreement influenced them, as it will continue to

See Thomas Eisner and Elizabeth A. Beiring, Biotic Exploration FundProtectingBiodiversity Through ChemicalProspecting,44(2) Biosci. 95, 97 (1994).
2' For a brief discussion of the Merck/INBio Agreement, see Blum, supra note 16.
21
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influence future biodiversity prospecting agreements that will inevitably
follow.,
It is no coincidence that INBio developed in Costa Rica and that Merck
chose INBio for its collaborative research. Costa Rica has a unique political,
social and economic environment that provides the stability, resources and
security necessary to make such an investment worth pursuing. Costa Rica is
also biologically rich, harboring more species per hectare than any other nation
on Earth. More than 10% of Costa Rica's land is protected in one of the
world's most successful national park systems.

H. OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL PROSPECTING
PROCESS AND FRAMEWORK
There are two basic legal frameworks for establishing a chemical
prospecting arrangement The first of these is an international contract which
specifically delineates the rights and obligations of each party, protecting all
parties to the contract with some legal remedy in the event the contract is
breached. The second is a collection and research permit which can provide
benefits to both the stewards and users of wildlands, ensuring fair and
sustainable use, without the complexity, formality and obligations of a
contract.
Chemical prospecting contracts have two primary parties- the collector
and the prospector. The prospector is most often a pharmaceutical or
biotechnology company that is interested in screening biological samples for
potentially useful chemicals. The collector supplies these biological samples,
often first performing basic taxonomic and preparatory work before shipping
Japan has worked out a biodiversity research program with Micronesia, and
Indonesia and Kenya are both developing biodiversity research facilities similar to
INBio. See WALTER V. REID ET AL., A New Lease on Life, in BIODIVERSITY
23

PROSPECTING:

USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 2

(Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993). Many developing countries such as China, Chile,
Mexico, India, Indonesia, Nepal and Nicaragua have been studying the INBio model
with hopes of establishing similar operations in their respective countries. See also
Blum, supra note 16, at 42.
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the samples to the prospector. Other interested parties who may benefit from
inclusion in chemical prospecting contracts, or the formation of separate
contracts, are the national government of the prospecting site, local
communities, and auxiliary collectors assisting the larger collecting institution.
The role ofeach of these parties is critical to the chemical prospecting process.
The collection process begins in the field with the identification and
harvesting of biological materials, including plants, bark, roots, insects,
micro6rganisms and other materials.24 The collection process is not random,
as scientists and researchers know that certain phylogenetic groups are richer
in certain types of chemicals, thus prioritizing them in the collection process.'
Extracts are usually prepared in the laboratory from the original biological
materials. The extracts are solutions containing all the chemicals found in the
natural product without the bulk of fiber and water.
The most important part of the chemical prospecting process takes place
in the laboratory. Here, extracts are screened for biologically active and
pharmacologically useful compounds. The screening process has been
revolutionized by the development of automated receptor- based screening
techniques that increase the screening process by hundreds of times.26 This
24 While the source of new chemicals in the chemical prospecting process is
normally a plant or in sect, every phylogenetic group has emerged as demonstrating
promise as a rich genetic resource - even many familiar and well-known groups
such as birds. The October 30, 1992 issue of SCIENCE described the discovery of the
first known poisonous bird, the Pitohui of New Guinea, which contains the toxin
homobatrachotoxin in its flesh and on its feathers. This is the same toxin produced by
poison-dart frogs and is similar to known de fenses of many insects, reptiles,
amphibians and fish. It is a neurotoxin hundreds of times more toxic than strychnine
and has numerous potential applications. Natalie Angier, Rare BirdIndeed Carries
Poison in Bright Feathers,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at Al.
25 See Andrew Beattie, Discovering New Biological Resources - Chance or
Reason? 42Biosci. 290 (1992) (describing the process of"biorational deduction.").
1 One source describes the receptor-based screening process: "Common targets for
drug developers are re ceptors, molecules on the exterior of or inside cells to which
other molecules attach, triggering specific changes. Once a gene for a receptor is
located, the receptor can be cloned and mass-produced. These receptors become
targets that are exposed to new compounds in the screening process. If a compound,
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increases the feasibility and profitability in the search of thousands of
chemicals that must be screened before finding the few useful chemicals
needed.
Parataxonomists and indigenous collectors play a significant role in the
chemical prospecting process. With limited funds and time, efficient
collecting draws upon the resource of local and rural populaces to assist in the
field and laboratory. These individuals living near the prospecting site are
hired and trained to collect specimens for screening with minimal supervision,
supplies and training. Basic natural science courses are taught to
parataxonomists, such as entomology, botany, herpetology, etc., as are basic
applied courses in collection and preparation techniques, taxonomy and
relevant chemistry. Practical skills are also taught as necessary, such as
operation of basic machinery, maps, computers and field guides. The
objective of the parataxonomists is to inventory the biota of an entire area
surrounding a prospecting site. A beneficial side effect of parataxonomy is
to increase local awareness of biodiversity, and its study and conservation.
Collection and research permits allow basically the same process as
chemical prospecting contracts. They differ, however, in their specificity and
function. Rather than privately negotiated contracts, governments can issues
collection permits to specific prospectors for a specified amount of time for the
extraction of specified types of information. Research permits also determine
27
exactly how the information is to be used and controlled.

be it synthesized or extracted from a plant, insect, or microorganism, binds to the
target, it could be pharmacologically valuable. So it is selected for further testing.
Other biochemical targets are enzymes, which catalyze reactions and can be inhibited
by alkaloids and other plant com pounds." Christopher Joyce, Western Medicine
Men Return to the Field,42 Biosci. 399 (1992).
27 See Daniel I Janzen et al., Research Management Policies: Permits for
Collecting and Research in the Tropics, in BIODIVERSrrY PROSPECTING: USING
GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 131 (Walter V. Reid et al.

eds., 1993).
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HI. THE ROLE OF IPRs IN CHEMICAL PROSPECTING

A. Incentivesfor Invention andInnovation
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to create IPRs
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' The intent is to offer
a reward and economic incentive for the creation of useful innovation that
furthers the "prior art" and that may inspire further innovation.29 The incentive
offered is "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention throughout the United States."3° This exclusive right is granted for
a period of twenty years to the patentee and his heirs or assigns.3

Chemical prospecting is an investment-intensive enterprise. The facilities
required to study potential discoveries include laboratories, advanced
equipment and highly trained personnel usually found only in developed
nations. Without adequate IPR protection, investment necesssary to support
chemical prospecting may never take place, and the inventive process would
not get off the ground.
The chemical prospecting process only begins with discovery and
invention. It is a much more intensive process to produce and prepare the
invention for practical commercial use. An incentive is necessary, after the
28 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. See also, Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218
(1832) (Chief Justice Mar shall arguing that the purpose of the patent statute is to
foster invention.).
I See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with
the services rendered."), reh 'g denied,347 U.S. 949 (1954).
30 United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §154 (1988).
31
The patent term under the orginal patent act was seventeen years. Id. The World
Trade Organization Agree ment (resulting from the Uruguay Round of the GATT
Talks) caused the patent term to be extended to "20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States," as of June 8, 1995. Dee. 8,
1994, Pub.L. 103-465, Title V,§ 532(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4983 (1994).
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issuance of the patent, to promote the development and application of new
technologies during the patent term.32 The monopoly conditions created by the
patent can be the best means of achieving this.33
Competition can suppress innovation by creating a number of
uncertainties and unfavorable conditions. Competition can place prohibitive
constraints on the time, resources and financial commitments necessary to
successfully invest in innovative and developmental research.3 4 The stability
and inflated rent35 resulting from the grant of a period of exclusive rights can
finance and stimulate the significant investment involved in developing and
marketing biodiversity.
One theory of post-invention innovation notes that, "while information
may be used without exhausting it, resources available to use information are
scarce, and property rights in inventions can improve the efficiency with which
these resources are managed."36 The transfer of technology, for instance, is
facilitated with greater IPR protection, reducing the amount of duplicative
research. There is little cost or risk involved in sharing information with
potential competitors, as their use of the information is limited to purely

32

See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Article, Patents and the Progress of Science:

Exclusive Rights andExperimental Use, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1989).

" The work of Joseph Schumpeter elucidated the advantages of monopoly
conditions, created by a patent, over competition in promoting technological
at 1039.
innovation. See id.
34Id.

I In a competitive market, prices are set at the point at which marginal cost equals
marginal benefit (the point at which the supply curve and demand curve intersect).
When one supplier is able to monopolize or dominate the market, however, the single
supplier supplies the good at the point at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue
(as opposed to demand or marginal benefit). The monopolist is able to restrict supply
and inflate prices over the efficient, competi tive allocation, capturing greater rent and
maximizing his surplus at the expense of social benefit.
I Eisenberg, supranote 31, at 1040, (discussing the "Prospect Theory" as presented
by Edmund Kitch.) See also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the

PatentSystem, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977). The Prospect Theory analogizes the
function of patent monopolies to exclusive mineral claim awards granted by the U.S.
government.

19951

CHEMICAL PROSPECTING

experimental use. 7 Any other uses of the patented information require the
payment of royalties to the inventor, who is usually more than happy to
capture this value.
B. Incentivesfor Conservation
Thejustification for chemical prospecting is based on its utility as a device
for preserving the biodiversity that fuels it.3" The discovery of a valuable
biological resource, however, can potentially lead to disaster. Like gold
prospectors rushing to tear down a mountain at the first yell of "Gold!,"
chemical prospectors will surely rush to capture the value of rare chemical
discoveries. Without adequate protection of IPRs in a genetic discovery, there
is little incentive to conserve the wild stock of a species. The natural result is
an open-access resource and the only issue is how to collect, extract and sell
the valuable natural product before others do the same. This can lead to
destructive extractive practices, sometimes even causing the eradication of the
source of the natural product.3 9
IPRs can provide some protection from such destruction. If the fruits of
extensive research, development, improvement and study can be enjoyed, then
these activities will take place. There are several benefits of this technological
development. First, synthetic versions of the natural product can be developed
in the laboratory, reducing the need for direct extraction of the natural product

"' While there is no specific provision for experimental use in the United States
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988), the courts have consistently recognized the
legitimacy of strictly experimental use of a patented invention. See Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F2d 858 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 31.
38 See Thomas Eisner, Prospecting
for Nature's ChemicalRiches, 6(3) IssuEs IN
ScI. & TECH. 30 (1990).
39 A mission sponsored by the U.S. National Cancer Institute to Kenya collected
27,215kg of Mavtenus buchananni for extraction of the anti-cancer compound
maytansine, eliminating the entire adult population of Matenus buchananni. See
BIODIVERSlTY PROSPECTING:

USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT, 3 (Walter V. Reid

et al. eds., 1993).
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and collection of its source." Second, biotechnology development is a
dynamic process, and even the best studied and most highly refined biological
resources, such as crop plants, are perpetually being genetically altered and
improved by hybridization with wild stock or relatives.
A major benefit of chemical prospecting is the cataloging and description
of species that it will promote. Many scientists feel that the starting point of
biodiversity conservation is knowing what is out there to conserve.'
Unfortunately, we know very little about the total number of species in nature,
and even for those species which we've discovered, little more is known about
them than superficial anatomical description and the scientific name assigned
to them.42 In the search for the few jewels among species, hundreds of
thousands of species will be described, catalogued and possibly even studied
along the way. Such a biological inventory of the world's biodiversity will aid
in developing the theoretical and factual background for biodiversity
conservation strategies.
Chemical prospectors are attracted to locations where biodiversity is in its
greatest concentration and where there are high degrees of endemism.43 This
involves chemical prospectors in the efforts to identify and conserve such
areas, particularly those areas threatened by development or destruction,
commonly referred to as "hotspots." 44 The work of chemical prospectors will
o The Pacific Yew, for example, was being collected in great volumes for extraction
of the anti-cancer drug camptothecin, and there were worries about the survival of the
species in the wild, until the U.S. National Cancer Insti tute developed a synthetic
version of camptothecin in the laboratory, reducing the need to collect Yew bark in the
wild. Rain Forests Can Supply Many ImportantDrugs, 55(6) BET'TER NUruTIoN
FOR TODAY'S LwING 28 (1993).
41 See Martha Rohas, The Species Problem and Conservation: What are We
Protecting?,6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 170 (1992).
42 See Wilson, supra note 9, at 132. Wilson states that this is the case for 99% of
known species.
3 Endemism is often presented as the percentage of species in a defined area, local,
regional or national, that occur only in that location.
" This term was initiated by Dr. Norman Myers, international consultant on
environment and development, and was intended to prioritize sites in greatest need of
protection based on both the amount of biodiversity and the severety of the threat to
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often take place at these hotspots of diversity, adding recognition and political
significance to the sites. Additionally, under an ideal chemical prospecting
contract, royalties will be paid from the profits made from biological samples
obtained at a particular site to governments or organizations in a position to
protect those sites but which lack adequate funding.45 Thus chemical
prospecting proceeds along a highly rational and scientifically prudent system.
C. Incentivesfor Public Disclosure
Many of the arguments in favor of biotechnology research are motivated
by a concern for human welfare. The Human Genome Project, for instance,
will involve fifteen years of intensive genetic research and over three billion
dollars.46 The justification for this massive project is based primarily on its
value in identifiying and eradicating human disease. Most of the research
necessary to accomplish this goal must take place after the genetic code is
revealed by the Human Genome Project research. This necessitates making
the data acquired by the project available to the international scientific
community.47 To do otherwise would undermine efforts to attain the very

its preservation at that location. Norman Myers, ThreatenedBiotas: "Hotspots"in
TropicalForests,8 ENVIRONMENTALIST 1 (1988).
45 Sarah A. Laird, Contractsfor Biodiversity Prospecting, in BIODIVERSrTY
PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RE SOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 108

(Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993). Laird states that "A royalty reflects the value of the
biological and intellectual informatoin provided by a collector, balanced by the relative
amount of intel lectual and financial investment a company must make to develop a
useful product," Id.at 112.
' The Human Genome Project is a massive project of the U.S. government to map
the location and actual nule otide sequence (genetic code) of each gene in human
somatic cells. Each human somatic cell contains twenty-three pairs of chromosomes
and some 100,000 genes, composed of some three billion nucleotide pairs. Leslie
Roberts, Report Cardon the Genome Project,253 SCI. 376 (1991).
41 The data acquired by the Human Genome Project are placed in three public
databases and are available to the international scientific community. See Catherine
M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Ifornationand PropertyTheory, 87 Nw. U. L. REv.
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results the project was established to achieve.
Public disclosure of new information is a fundamental justification for the

U.S. patent system.' Under this system, an inventor is granted a monopoly
of limited duration on the production, use and sale of the invention. 9 As a
quid pro quo for this reward, an inventor is required to disclose a specification
of the invention, including information which fully describes the invention, the
"manner and process of making and using it," and the "best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.""0 The information
disclosed can then be made available to other inventors to improve the
invention, create new inventions and advance technology further.
In satisfying the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, it is often
necessary to deposit biological materials with the regional facility designated
by the Budapest Treaty.5 This is highly significant in regard to biodiversity
research which typically deals with species that are previously unknown and
undescribed. The written description is not enough for taxonomic purposes
which generally require type specimens to be deposited before the
classification will be recognized by the international scientific community.
Even more significant is the availability of living samples of the species to
researchers who wish to "carry out the best mode" of creating the invention,
which may be impossible if the species is obtained from nature.5 2
1037, 1043 (1992).
' Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the ProgressofScience: Exclusive Rights
andExperimental Use, 56 U. CHm. L. REv. 1017 (1989).
49 See supra note 29.
o United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). The written description must
be "in such full, clear, con cise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con nected, to make and use the
same." Id.
" See Sheryl Rubinstein Silverstein, Note, BiotechnologyPatentsAnd The Deposit
Requirement: Removing UncertaintyAfterAgmen v. ChugaiPharmaceutical.66
S.CAL. L.REV. 937 (1993).
2 The Federal Circuit upheld a decision of the Patent Office in Agmen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1210, cert. denied,502 U.S. 856 (199 1)
(reaffirming the necessity of depositing biological materials ob tained from nature, but
deciding that when "the organism is created by insertion of genetic material into a cell
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D. Rewarding the Creationof Commercialand Social Value
InMazerv. Stein, the Supreme Court indicated that the creation of social
value resulting from the investment of labor and creativity is deserving of a
reward in the form of property rights.53 Chemical prospecting is a highly
technical, complex, time consuming, labor-intensive and expensive process,
but the products of this process save lives, make lives more enjoyable, and
generally increase human welfare. Thus, the investment of these efforts is
highly justified by the potential value that can be created, and sufficient IPR
protection rewards those who create this value by giving them a stake in it.
It is estimated that the value of prescription drugs with active ingredients
derived from plants exceeds $15 billion in the United States alone.54 The
value of all prescription and over-the- counter drugs derived from plant
sources in the developed world is probably more than $50 billion annually.55
Farm-level sales of agricultural biotechnology have been projected to be as
high as $100 billion annually by the year 2000.56

obtained from generally available sources, then all that is required is a description of
the best mode and an adequate description of the means of carrying out the invention,
not deposit of the cells.") Id.at 1211. The relaxed standard for genetic engi neering
of organisms means that a great deal of effort will need to be expended by researchers
merely to reproduce the existing patent, having to "reinvent the wheel" as some critics
argue. See Silverstein, supranote 50, at 950.
53 See supra note 28, at 218.
ASee BIODIVERsrTY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, 7 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993).
5 In 1985, one source estimated this figure to be $43 billion. Inflation and incresed
sales makes $50 billion a likely underestimate of this statistic. Peter Principe, The
Economic Significance of Plants and Their Constituents as Drugs, 3 ECON. AND
M_tICiNALPtuwarREs. 1, 1-17 (H. Wagner et al. eds., 1989). Developed countries,
for the pur poses of this statistic are: all European nations, Japan, Australia, Canada
and the United States. Id.
5 See World Bank; AgriculturalBiotechnology: The Next Green Revolution?,
World Bank Technical Paper No. 133 (1991).
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Many other uses for chemical and genetic discoveries in nature, besides
pharmaceuticals and agricultural biotechnology products, have been patented.
This includes numerous industrial uses, such as textile production, oils, dyes,
lubricants, waxes, glues and other industrial substances. " Another interesting
use of the "fruits" of chemical prospecting includes environmental
applications, as organisms, genes and chemicals are discovered that remove
environmental pollutants or heavy metals from the atmosphere and water, act
as bioindicators of environmental health, or allow more efficient treatments of
wastes.' Chemical and genetic resources are still largely unexplored, and we
should not underestimate the potential of the world's forests and c -eans, or the
soil beneath our feet; nor should we allow the efforts of those wht. bring these
technologies to us to go unrewarded.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF IPRs TO BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS IN UNITED STATES LAW
Patents are the most useful intellectual property device to the chemical
prospector.5 9 A period of exclusive rights can permit a prospector to capture
a great deal of economic rent from a patented natural product or a derivative

" According to Norman Myers, international consultant on the environment and
development, lubri cants are exceptionally significant industrial products derived from
biological sources. He states that the U.S. Department of Agriculture has recently
screened 6,400 plants for lubricating oils and waxes and found promis ing leads in
460. Some of these products can not be synthesized in the laboratory, and require
extraction from natural sources. NORMAN MYERS, The SinkingArk: A New Look at
the Problem of DisappearingSpecies, 73 (1979).
SBSee id.at 78.
9 The World Intellectual Property Organization defines a patent as, "A legally
enforceable right granted by virtue of a law to a person to exclude, for a limited time,
others from certain acts in relation to a described new invention; the privilege is
granted by a government authority as a matter of right to the person who is entitled to
apply for it and who fulfils the prescribed conditions." This is the role of the patent
system in the transfer of technology to developing countries, UNCTAD, U.N. Doc.
TDIB/398 (1975).

19951

CHEMICAL PROSPECTING

of it.60 There are vast applications and uses for nature's storehouse of genetic
information, once its biological materials are developed into marketable
commodities or services. Patent protection, where applicable, can change what
might be used as a cattle pasture into a biotechnology factory.
The first step toward patent protection is determining whether an
invention is patentable subject matter. The Patent Act defines the scope of
patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof" 6' There are, however, a number of exceptions to this generous rule.
The Supreme Court has refused to allow patents for laws of nature, mere
principles and abstract ideas.62 Also disallowed by the courts are naturally
occuring substances, including biological organisms. 63 This seems to create
a major complication for chemical prospecting, which has as its objective the
discovery of products of nature.
Not all products of nature are unpatentable, however. In fact, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted a patent to Louis Pasteur in 1873

' See supra notes 8 and 9.
§ 101 (1988).
See O!Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853) (declaring that "the
discovery of a principle in natu ral philosophy or physical science, is not patentable.");
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, (1978) and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
(1972).
63 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) in which
the Supreme Court ruled that bacteria are excluded from patentability, even when
applied to novel applications. In that case, the patentee had discov ered that two
species of root-nodule bacteria were not mutually inhibitive, thus permitting
"innoculation" of legumes by mixing cultures of the two bacteria. Holding their
combination unpatentable, the Court ruled that, "Their use in combi nation does not
improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally
provided and act quite independently of any effort by the patentee." Id. at 131. The
Supreme Court later held inDiamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), that when
bacteria are altered significantly from their natural state, producing new
characteristics, that it is patentable subject matter.
61 35 U.S.C.

152

BUFFALOJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol.11

for a microorganism.' A case can be made that all inventions are really the
products of nature, having their source in a naturally occuring organic or
inorganic resource. It is inaccurate to assume that courts are concerned with
the source of an invention, however. The real concern is that the invention is
the product of human ingenuity and transformation.65 The reason for this
concern is that the Patent Act also requires a patentable invention to be novel"
and non-obvious.' An invention that merely occurs naturally but has not yet
been discovered or described is neither new nor non-obvious, but is merely
hidden from public consciousness. Courts have decided that it is not enough
to bring the product of nature to the attention of the public; it is necessary to
produce a new and useful invention through the application of the creative
process. Only then is the reward of patent protection justified. With
biological materials, the creative process is typically the isolation, purification
or genetic engineering of a micro6rganisms or plant.
Enforcement of patents is achieved by infringement suits' which, if
successful, can result in treble damages69 and an award of attorney's fees.7"
Infringement suits may be brought against a domestic or foreign infringer for
violations of any U.S. patent, without regard to the location the of manufacture
or business, as long as the infringing product is in the U.S.7' Products
produced by means of processes patented in the U.S. are also subject to

' See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, supra note 62, at n.9. Also mentioned in that case
were two patents for micro6rganisms from 1967 and 1968, prior to the passage of the
Plant Variety Protection Act. Id.
65 One interesting aspect is the difference in the decisions in the Funk Bros. and
Chakrabarty cases, supranote 62.
6 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
6 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
68 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988).
69 35 U.S.C. § 284. Treble damages are rarely awarded, however. Telephone
Interview with SUNY at Buffalo, School of Law, Adjunct Professor Edwin T. Bean,
Jr., (various discussions throughout Feb. 1995).
70 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988).
71 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
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infringement suits.72 An alternative to infringement suits is available under the
TariffAct of 1930 which permits the International Trade Commission to issue
exclusionary orders preventing infringing products from entering the U.S."
While patents are not generally allowed for products of nature, some
exceptions are made, particularly for plants. The first intellectual property
rights available for plants were created by the Plant Patent Act (PPA) of 1930.
7"This law gave plant breeders who develop new cultivars the exclusive right
to propagate the patented plant by asexual reproduction for 17 years. Since
the passage of the Plant Patent Act in 1930, over 6,000 plant patents have
been issued, encouraging the development of new geneotypes of cultivated
plants by private industry.75
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 197076 (PVPA) expanded protection
to new, sexually reproduced cultivars. Patent-like protection is granted by the
Department of Agriculture which was authorized by Congress to issue Plant
Variety Protection (PVP) Certificates, which protect specific genotypes for 18
years. The PVPA contains a "fanner's exemption" which permits farmers to
save seeds for replanting in subsequent years or to sell to other farmers from
the reserve that they had saved for their own use. The PVPA also contains a

' These actions can be brought under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (g), but note that this section
may not protect against the use of patented intermediate products used in the
manufacturing process. See Ann Sturtz Viksnins, Comment, Amgen, Inc. v. United
States InternationalTrade Commission: DesignerGenes Don't Fit,76 MNN L. REv.
161 (1991).
73 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1988). The Tariff Act of 1930 was amended significantly
in favor of greater protection of U.S. IPRs against unfair competition by foreign
infringers by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
4 The Towsend-Pamell Plant Patent Act of May 23, 1930, Pub. L. No. 245, (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. 161 et seq.).
7' See Robert J. Jondle, Overview and Status of PlantProprietaryRights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WTM PLANTS, American

Society of

Agronomy, special publication, no. 52, at Chap. 1. (comprised in part of papers
presented at aworkshop held Jan. 31-Feb. 3, 1989, in Anaheim, Calif. (1989) at 5.).
76 Plant Variety Protection Act of Dec. 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542
(codified in 7 U.S.C. 2321 et seq.).
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research exemption which permits protected cultivars to be used for research
and development of new lines in laboratories and development programs.
Over 2100 PVP certificates have been issued since 1970."
Biotechnology processes, genes, seeds, plant parts, and hybrids, not
protectable under the PPA or PVPA, may be eligible for protection by utility
patents, which are issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, and are valid
for a period of 17 years. 8 Unlike the PVPA, utility patents contain no
farmer's exemption or research exemption. Unlike PVPA protection, however,
a utility patent (as well as a plant patent) requires a sufficient showing of
novelty and utility that often prevents protection for close look-alike hybrids
and cultivars, reflecting only minor variation in color, taste, yield, etc. Also,
utility patents can be obtained not only for plants and hybrids, but also for
microbes and animals.
The expansion of IPRs in plants in the U.S. may have been a reaction to
a preceeding trend in Europe. In the 1940's many European nations
established Plant Breeders Rights (PBR) which extended protection to all
sexually reproducing plants. Breeders in the U.S. have their choice among the
three statutory schemes described above, all of which have helped the U.S.
remain a world leader in agricultural and biotechnological development, which
is growing rapidly worldwide. More than 600 field tests of genetically
engineered crops are being conducted at present in over 20 nations. "
Trade secret law proves a level of protection which is inferior to that
conferred by a patent, but which requires a lesser degree of inventiveness and
is less expensive and complicated to achieve. A trade secret is defined by the
Restatement of Torts as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a

''

See supranote 74, at 7.

I at 8. The PTO began issuing utility patents for plants in 1985.
Id.
7 Vidal, supra note 1.
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To have a valid trade secret, one must show that a substantial element of
secrecy exists, but the secrecy need not be absolute.8 ' Limited disclosure of
trade secrets is expected, and is, in fact, a primary justification for the creation
of trade secret law. The information can be presented to employees,
corporations, potential purchasers of the secret and others, but the disclosure
should be made with an understanding of confidentiality and the information
disclosed must be obtained properly and used fairly.' Trade secret law may
be most useful in protecting the knowledge of indigenous peoples. It is also
important when the prospector is not the same individual or entity as the
inventor, in order to protect the information until it is transferedto the inventor.

V. THE PRESENT STATUS OF IPR PROTECTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. From Paristo Uruguay
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was ratified by the United States on
November 26, 1975, and came into force in 1978. The PCT provides for a
standardized and centralized process for review of patent applications
including international searches. The PCT enables the applicant to file one
application (an international application) and have that application
80 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757, cmt. b (1939).
8I

RESrATEMENr OF TORTS, § 757, cmt. b (1939) states, "[One] may, without losing

his protection, communicate [the secret] to employees involved in its use. He may
likewise communicate it to others pledged to secrecy ....Neverthe less, a substantial
element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there
would be difficulty in acquiring the information." For an overview of trade secret law
see Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195 (1986).
12 RESTATEmENTOFTORTS, § 757 (1939) provides that, "One who discloses or uses
another's trade secret, with out a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he
discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him."
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acknowledged as a regular national filing in those member countries which the
applicant "designates" or "elects." Filing in the desired countries (known as
"entering the the national phase") must still be made within specified time
periods. Thus, a patent grant must still be obtained in each desired country in
order to have patent rights therein, but the PCT application allows the
applicant to defer filings in individual countries.
Under Chapter I of the PCT, the applicant must enter the national stage
within 20 months from the priority date of the application. Chapter II of the
PCT states, the applicant may optionally file within 19 months of the priority
date a demand for international preliminary examination in which event the
applicant has until 30 months (31 months for an EPO application) from the
priority sdate to enter the national phase. An international preliminary
examination report is issued which comments on the novelty, inventiveness,
and utility of the invention. The member countries are not bound by this
report.
The U.S., until 1987, refused to be bound by Chapter II of the PCT,
offficialy filing a reservation when the treaty was ratified. This objection was
based on there being different standards of examinations by the U.S. and
foreign patent officers.
The PCT has been used extensively by many nations, but the U.S. has
accounted for about one-third of all applications filed under this treaty. The
PCT contains eight chapters.
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 3 was
completed in 1883 and has since been revised six times.84 It extended
protection to patents and other IPRs in products of "agricultural and extractive
8 5 The Paris Convention has remained the primary international
industries.""
instrument for the protection of patents, and has only recently been

" The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (entered into force April 26,
1970) [hereinafter Paris Covention].
' The revisions were made at Brussels in 1900, Washington in 1911, The Hague in
1925, London in 1934, Lisbon in 1958, and Stockholm in 1967.
' Paris Convention, supra note 82, art. I § 3.
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overshadowed by the patent protection provisions of the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) has assumed administrative responsibilities for
the Paris Convention since 1967.86
The Paris Convention establishes equality of treatment in patents, or the
requirement of member states to deal with domestic and foreign patent
applicants in the same manner and with the conferral of the same rights. 7 The
Convention does not, however, set any specific standards or mandate any
specific rights, exclusions or other provisions, but rather leaves these decisions
to the individual member states.8 " Member states are not permitted, however,
to grant compulsory licenses for a period of four years from the date of filing
or three years from the date of the grant of a patent, nor institute proceedings
to revoke a patent for a period of two years from the grant of the first
compulsory license.8 9
When an individual files for a patent in any member state, the Paris
Convention grants a priority right of twelve months from the date of the filing
during which applications can be made in all other member states. I Member
states may not prevent the importation of patented articles, and may not forfeit
a patent as a result of importation.9' International disputes regarding patent
protection are subject to negotiation, and if this proves insufficient, the dispute
can be referred to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.'

' WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations based in Geneva, Switzerland
that handles all issues dealing with Intellectual Property.
s Paris Convention, supranote 82, art. 2(1) states "[n]ationals of any country of the
Union shall, as regards the pro tection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other
countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may
hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for
by this Convention."
s Id. at art. 4'(1).
IId. at arts. 5(A)(4) and 5(A)(3), respectively.
IId. at art. 4(A)(1). The term of the period of the priority right is set in art. 4(C)(1).
91 Id. at art. 5(A)(1).
92

Id. at art. 28(l).

158

BUFFALO JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol.1H

The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)' was ratified by the United States
on November 26, 1975, and came into force in 1978. Chapter I of the PCT
provides for a standardized and centralized process for review of patent
applications, including international searches to determine the state of the prior
art in all member states. Chapter I also permits applications for international
patents that grant international recognition to patents that are also recognized
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, or equivalent offices in foreign
nations. The applicant must begin this process at any patent application
office, within 20 months of the earliest filing date of the patent application.
Chapter II provides an additional, optional procedure for preliminary
examination of patents by an International Preliminary Examining Authority
which comments on the novelty, inventiveness and utility of patent
applications. The U.S., until 1984, refused to be bound by Chapter II of the
PCT, officially filing a reservation which the treaty has ratified.94 This
objection was based on the fact that the standards of foreign patent offices
were often used in place of the standards of the PTO, and they differed
significantly, until about ten years later when large scale harmonization of
patent office standards took place internationally. The PCT has been used
extensively by many nations, but the U.S. has accounted for about one-third
of all applications filed under this treaty.95 The PCT contains eight chapters,
but only the first two are substantive.
International protection of IPRs featured prominently in the recent Urguay
Round talks of the General Agreement on Trade and Tarrifs (GATT).96 The

' Itwas opened for signature on June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733
(entered into force Jan. 24, 1978).
SSee Marian Nash Leich, ContemporaryPracticeof the UnitedStates Relating to
InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 884, 889 (1984) ( letter to President Reagan,
dated June 28, 1984, from Secretary of State George P. Shultz).
" This was the approximate proportion of applications filed by U.S. applicants
during the mid-1980's. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 884, 889 (1984).
"' See Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 20,
1991, GATT Document MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.I [hereinafter TRIPS Draft
Agreement].
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stated objective of the GATT IPR provisions is to "contribute to the promotion
of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge, in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations."9 7
Article 3 of the TRIPS Draft Agreement preserves the national treatment
provisions of Art. 2(1) of the Paris Convention, providing that all member
nations must accord equal rights and protections to nationals of all other
member states that are provided to the nationals of their own nation.' Article
4 adds most-favored-nation treatment, requiring that "any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by a [Member] to the nationals of any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of
all other [Members].""
It has been suggested that the efforts of the U.S. to use the GATT as a
forum for promoting international IPR protection is a conscious effort to shift
control away from WIPO, an organization that the U.S. has little leverage in,
and in favor of GATT, "an organization in which the U.S. remain[s] the
dominant player."'" This shift also links the IPR issue to international trade,
forcing those nations who wish to retain good trade status with the U.S. to also
swallow numerous U.S. demands for international IPR protection. The U.S.
opposes WIPO's approach to IPR protection which includes compulsory
licensing provisions and weak enforcement mechanisms.' 0 '
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) was established in 1961 and has filled part of the gap in international
patent protection left by the Paris Convention. UPOV provides patent
protection to plant breeders who develop distinctive, uniform and stable

97

Id. at art. 7.

98

Id. at art. 3.

Id. at art. 4.
100

Graham Flack, Note, The Development of an InternationalPatentRegime:

SoundLegal Theory orMisguidedLeapofFaith,2 DALHOUSIE J. OF LEGAL STUDIES

1,54 (1992).
10, Balraj, supra note 17, at 87.
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varieties of plants. Participation in UPOV has been limited, with only 19
developed nations as members, and deals exclusively with plant germplasm.
UPOV does represent, however, a significant model for further international
recognition of IPRs specifically in biological materials.
An obstacle to the international protection of IPRs in plant germplasm is
the long-standing treatment of plant germplasm as part of the "common
heritage of mankind" which is freely accessable to all bona fide users."° The
principal organization responsible for the conservation of plant genetic
resources is the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), a
constituent of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization created
in 1974. IBPGR maintains gene banks °3 from over 100 nations and is
responsible for the collection, characterization and documentation of the
genetic resources of cultivated (crop and forage) plants. 4 IBPGR freely
provides biological samples and information to all interested and legitimate
users.
The same ethic pervades other major gene banks such as that of the
International Rice Research Institute and the many botanical gardens of the
world. '° Extensive and comprehensive records are often kept of species in
gene banks and botanical gardens, with computerized access available to
researchers throughout the world. The international scientific community has
a universal concensus that scientific information, including genetic and
biological information, belongs properly to the entire scientific community
which is engaged in a collective effort to empirically discover as much about
the real world as possible, and the information that individual researchers
discover is instrumental in the research community's struggle toward this end,

102 See J. Trevor Williams, Identifying and Protecting the Origins of OurFood
Plants, in BIODIERsrrY, 241 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
103 Gene banks are repositories of seeds, tubers and other plant materials which
attempt to store and preserve as many representative samples of plant genetic diversity
as possible for future use in the breeding, improvement and prop agation of cultivated
plants.
'o See supra note 101.
' See Peter S. Ashton, Conservation ofBiological Diversity in Botanical Gardens,
in BIODIvERsrry, 276 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
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and therefore must be relinquished.'"
A number of regional agreements and treaties are also affecting and
harmonizing IPR protection in many nations. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) contains provisions for patents, trademarks, copyrights,
trade secrets and plant breeders rights that bind the United States, Canada and
Mexico. NAFTA requires member states to adhere to the provisions of most
of the other international agreements discussed above, and as many of these
agreements, mandates national treatment, or protection offered to foreigners,
at least equal to that offered to domestic entitites. °7
NAFTA permits member states to exclude from patentability plants and
animals, other than micro6rganisms, and "essentially biological processes for
the production of plants or animals, other than non-biological and
microbiological processes for such production." 10s NAFTA does mandate,
however, that parties provide for plant variety protection or a system of sui
generis protection.1°9 One of the most significant effects of NAFTA's IPR
provisions is that it will bring Mexico's patent protection up to par with that
of the U.S. and Canada, as Mexico has lagged significantly behind. Canada,
however, would be required under NAFTA to repeal a law limiting the
duration of pharmaceutical patents and providing for compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals." 0
The European Economic Community (EEC), now known as the European
Union (EU), began to address IPR concerns well before NAFTA was even
conceived. Article 36 of the EEC Treaty provides an exception for industrial
and commercial property to the elimination of quantitative restrictions between
member states contained in articles 30-34 of that treaty. The principal
concern of the EU is that import restrictions grounded on industrial and
,o6 See Eisenberg, supranote 3 1.
'0 Intellectual Property Provisions of North American Free Trade Agreement, 1994,
[hereinafter NAFTA] Canada-Mexico-United States, arts. 1701 and 1703, 6 World
IntellectualPropertyRept. 284, 284-295 (1992). NAFTA's member state treaty
obligations are listed in Art. 1701 and national treatment is established by Art. 1703.
108 Id. at art. 1709 § 3(b)-(e).
109 Id. at art. 1709 § 3.
"o See 6 World IntellectualPropertyReport, 208, 208-209 (1992).
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commercial property concerns do not constitute "a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.""I
Importation of products into an EU nation can be prevented under Article 36
if a valid patent is held in that nation, even if the infringing product is
produced legally elsewhere.12
Legal patents are one of the few conditions within the scope of IPR
protection under Article 36, however, as differing national standards are not
13
generally a sufficient basis for restricting the free movement of goods.
Additionally, the exhaustion of rights doctrine applies to patents, copyrights
and trademarks in the EU and imposes a narrow construction on Article 36
ensuring that the benefits of the economic monopoly created by IPR protection
are proportionate to the ends they serve, and are terminated once the right is
exploited and economic rewards are received.14
One positive and simplifying factor in the IPR regimes of European
nations is the process of harmonization of national laws, which is exemplified

"' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC Treaty]
art. 36. See Case 144/81, Keurkoop B.V. v. Nancy Kean Gifts B.V., E.C.R. 2853
(1982).
2 See Case 24/67, Parke Davis v. Probel, E.C.R. 55 (1968) (holding that a major
U.S. pharmaceutical company which held a valid patent in the Netherlands could
prevent the importation into that country of the same pharmaceutical produced in Italy
where drug patents are disallowed under national law.)
"' See Case 16/83, Criminal Proceedings Against Karl Prantl, E.C.R. 1299 (1984)
(the European Court of Justice ruled that an exclusive right to use a certain type of
bottle granted by national legislation in a Member State may not be used as a bar to
imports of wines originating in another Member State put up in bottles of the same or
similar shape in accordance with a fair and traditional practice observed in that
Member State.)
"I See Case 16n4, Centrafann B.V v. Winthrop B.V., E.C.R. 1183 (1974) and its
parallel decision Case 15n4, Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., E.C.R. 1147
(1974). See also Case 378, Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Products Corp.,
E.C.R. 1823 (1978).
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in Article 100 of the EEC Treaty." s Apart from such general convergence of
the domestic legal systems of Europe, which has been particularly accellerated
with regard to environmental regulation,' 6 several agreements have promoted
17
the harmonization of European patent law.'
B. The UNCED Convention on BiologicalDiversity
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) met in June of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and produced a Convention
on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Treaty) that was signed by 150
nations. " ' The Biodiversity Treaty was seen at first as a threat to the
international protection of intellectual property rights. Some saw the treaty as
potentially threatening to interfere with the United States' efforts to advance

"s See EEC Treaty, supra note 112, at art. 100. ("The Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action
in Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common
market.")
16
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 112, specifically addresses
harmonization of EU environmental law, and many directives have been aimed at
species preservation. See also EEC Habitats Directive, Council Directive 92/43/EEC
(May 21, 1992).
117 The primary agreement harmonizing European patent law is the Convention on
the Grant ofEuropean Patents, Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, TS No. 20 (1978), 13 I. L.
M. 270, which was later supplemented by the Community Patent Convention, Dec. 15,
1975, 0. J.L 17/1 (Jan. 26, 1976), as modified, 0. J. L 401/10 (Dec. 30, 1989). Both
these agreements fail to recognize the patentability of biotechnological innovations,
but such an agreement has been intro duced into the European Parliament in recent
years, and is likely to be incorporated into European IPR law.
"' UNCED Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992 - September 30,
1993,31 . L. M. 818 (1992), UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC.5/4 [hereinafter Biodiversity
Treaty].
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intellectual property rights protection in the GATT talks."9 The treaty was
later seen as a potentially beneficial instrument for encouraging both
biodiversity conservation and IPR protection.
Chemical prospecting arrangements will occur in the absence of any
international agreements as matters of private international law.' Many feel,
however, that international cooperation in the formation of chemical
prospecting contracts is facilitated by the adherence of contracting parties to
internationally agreed upon provisions for goodwill, commitment and fairness
in the protection of biodiversity in each respective nation and
internationally.'
Agreements such as the Merck/INBio Contract are explicitly encouraged
by article 18 of the Biodiversity Treaty, which requires parties to promote
technical and scientific cooperation through the establishment of appropriate
institutions," training,'z clearinghouses 124 and joint ventures."z The private
contract established benefited from clear intellectual property provisions and
governments that were willing, interested and trustworthy to enforce those
contractual provisions. Encouraging other governments to do the same will
permit chemical prospecting agreements to become important international
mechanisms for the conservation of biodiversity and will fuel biotechnical and
chemical innovation.
Article I identifies the objectives of the Biodiversity Treaty as "the

"9 Patent and TrademarkOffice and Biotech Group Explain Objections to Earth
Summit's Biodiversity Treaty, 44 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 120 (June 11,
1992).
120 Thomas Eisner quoted in Blum, supranote 16, at 41.
32 See Blum, supranote 16, at 41. The author suggests that the U.S. refusal to sign
the Biodiversity Treaty may be seen by some nations as the refusal to agree to preserve
its own biodiversity while insisting on the same obligations for other nations, or as an
admission of the likelihood of the U.S. getting the better end of the bargain in any
arrrangements that may be worked out.
" See supra note 117, at art. 18(1).
123Id. at art. 18(2).
124 Id. at art. 18(3).
'25Id. at art. 18(5).
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conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of
genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights
over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding."' 26 This
statement seeks to establish a system of reciprocity in which both access to
genetic resources and appropriate transfer of technology is protected, while
also working toward the conservation of the genetic resources. Article 1
assumes that these objectives are complimentary, or at least that it is possible
to pursue one or more of them at the same time.
Article 3 imposes upon states "the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."' 27 This may
involve measures to evaluate patents for their potential environmental impact
and possibly the denial of patents for technologies that are harmful to the
environment of other nations. As with other areas of law involving a showing
of causation, it will be necessary to define the degree of proximity and
forseeability required as evidence that a technology has a negative
environmental impact. Refusing to grant a patent on a chemical that is
extracted from its natural source by destructive means is the kind of
intellectual property rights restriction that the Biodiversity Treaty may
1
require. 2
Article 4 deals with the jurisdictional scope of the Biodiversity Treaty.
For "components of biological diversity," Article 4 limits the jurisdictional
scope to "areas within the limits of its national jurisdiction.'. 29 "Processes and
activities," however, fall within the jurisdictional scope of the Biodiversity
Treaty "regardless of where their effects occur."' 30 This provision mandates
the extraterritorial applicability and enforcement of the Biodiversity Treaty

126
127

Id. at art. 1.
Id. at art. 3.

See supra note 39.
See supra note 117, at art. 4(a).
30 Id. at art. 4(b).

12

129
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and will require domestic legislation to expand jurisdiction accordingly.'
Article 7 requires all parties to the Biodiversity Treaty to identify and
monitor components of biological diversity within their territory. Special
consideration is to be given to categories of biological diversity identified in
Annex I to the Biodiversity Treaty. Article 7(d) requires parties to maintain
and organize data collected from their identification and monitoring
activities.' 33 This will encourage the creation or expansion of databases and
publication of information related to biodiversity. The copyright and trade
secret protection of this information will inevitably have to be weighed against
the benefits of public disclosure of the information. A system should emerge
to adequately compensate private acquisition of data in return for public
disclosure and use.
Article 8() of the Covention on Biological Diversity requires each
contracting party to "respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity."'" This subsection also requires parties to "encourage the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practices." The Biodiversity Treaty, thus, appears to

"' Other U.S. conservation laws have extraterritorial applicability. See D.C.
Brennan, ExtraterritorialApplication of FederalWildlife Statutes: A New Rule of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 CORNELL INTL. L. J. 143 (1979),; J.C. Beiers, The
InternationalApplicability ofSection 7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 29
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171 (1989).
132 Annex I of the Biodiversity Treaty delineates three categories of biological
diversity: 1) ecosystems and habitats, 2) species and communities, and 3) described
genomes and genes of social, scientific or economic importance. A strong utilitarian
emphasis is demonstrated by the prioritization scheme described in Annex I. This is
conducive to the estab lishment of IPRs in components of biological diversity, as it is
this consumptive value that provides the incentives for acquisition of patents. Wise
biological diversity prospectors will also naturally prioritize the most threatened and
unique species and those that are most useful in the conservation and monitoring of
biological diversity.
"I See supra note 117, at art. 7(d).
1

Id. at art. 80).
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presuppose the provision of patents or trade secrets for indigenous
information. Domestic intellectual property law may, therefore, need to be
reformed to prevent the exclusion of indigenous information, unless there is
no such discrimination.135 Article 10(c), additionally, requires nations to
"protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance
with traditional cultural practices." Protecting intellectual property rights in
such customary uses will permit licensing of the uses, generating revenue for
indigenous peoples, providing an incentive that will encourage such uses.' 36
Article 9 deals with ex situ conservation, requiring the establishment of
a variety of facilities such as gene banks, plantations and zoos that are
equipped to both conserve and conduct research on the biological materials
they store. This encouragement of research should certainly include chemical
prospecting as vell as more basic research. The research is preferably to be
conducted in the country of origin of the genetic resources, thus favoring a
Merck/INBio-style agreement to research conducted in a foreign gene bank
37
from exported biological materials.
Article 15(1) reaffirms "the sovereign rights of States over their natural
resources [and that their] authority to determine access to genetic resources
rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation." At
the same time, Article 15(2) requires parties to "create conditions to facilitate
access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other

'" It
seems to be the case in the United States that that the legal system does not treat
indigenous peoples any differ ently with regard to the protection of intellectual
property rights. See Michael A. Gollin, The Convention on BiologicalDiversityand
Intellectual Property Rights, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAIN ABLE DEVELOPMENT, Annex 3, 289 (Walter V. Reid et al.

eds., 1993).
136 See supra note 117, at art. 11. Article I1specifically encourages the
establishment of incentives, stating: "Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible
and as appropriate, adopt economically and socially sound measures that act as
incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of components of biological
diversity."
137 Id at arts. 9(a) and 9(b). Articles 9(a) and 9(b) both note that it is preferable to
locate ex situ conservation facili ties in the country of origin of the genetic materials.
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Contracting ]Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the
objectives ofthis Convention." The two standards that the Biodiversity Treaty
sets for access to genetic resources are that it is based on mutually agreed
terms" and that there is prior informed consent 39 by the source nation.
Article 15(6) stresses that agreements should include provisions to ensure that
nations accessing foreign genetic resources actually participate in scientific
research which utilizes the resources. Any proceeds from the commercial
exploitation of the genetic resources must be shared equitably and fairly with
the country of origin. 4 Finally, article 15(7) requires nations to adopt the
appropriate legislative, administrative or policy measures necessary to make
certain that the sharing of the proceeds from the exploitation of the resources
is in fact fair and equitable.
Many critics of the Biodiversity Treaty have found article 16 ambiguous
and consisting of convoluted language. "' This uncertainty of obligation with
regard to the transfer of technology is often cited as the motivation behind the
U.S.'s refusal to sign the Biodiversity Treaty.' 42 Indeed, article 16(2) can be
seen as contrary to free trade principles, by requiring the transfer of technology
to developing countries to be "provided and/or facilitated under fair and most
favorable terms." This does not obligate developed nations to give developing
nations the better end of the deal, however, as this section also provides that
the transfer must be as "mutually agreed." Similarly, articles 16(3) and 16(4)
Id. at art. 15(4).
Id. at art. 15(5).
"oMerck, for instance, agreed to pay royalties of 1-3% of its profits to INBio, and
also committed significant funds to assist the Costa Rican government in conservation
programs.
141Gollin, supra note 134, at 295.
142 The U.S. in a resolution adopted on May 22, 1992 invited the Governing Council
of the United Nations Environ ment Programme to consider requesting the Executive
Director of the Programme to convene meetings of an Intergov emnental Committee
on the Convention on Biological Diversity starting in 1993 which would consider,
among other issues, "modalities for the transfer of technologies, in particular to
developing countries, relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components, as well as technical cooperation in support of
national capacity-building in those areas." art. 2(d), 311. L. M. 842, (1992).
138

39
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require parties to the Biodiversity Treaty to adopt any legislative,
administrative or policy measures to ensure adequate transfer of technology
to developing nations when access to genetic resources is given, again subject
to mutually agreed terms. The effect of article 16 seems to send a message
that parties should favor developing nations in the transfer of technology, but
that they are not obligated in any way to do so.
Article 16(5) sends an equally ambiguous and ineffectual message
regarding the international protection of intellectual property rights. This
section states: "the Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other
intellectual property rights may have an influence on the implementation of
this Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation
and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and
do not run counter to its objectives." This eliminates only the possible extreme
views of intellectual property rights as either essential or entirely unrelated to
the equitable sharing of technology. 43 Any indication of the practical import
of this provision with regard to the limitations to be imposed on intellectual
property rights remains a mystery.
Articles 15 and 16 establish a balance between two competing interests
in chemical prospecting- access to genetic and chemical resources on the one
hand and the transfer of technology on the other. The term "reciprocity" is
used to describe the equitable flow of genetic resources from biologically rich
developing nations to technologically rich developed nations in exchange for
the transfer of technology. For developing nations, the tradeoff is between
protecting sovereignty over all resources or allowing foreign nations at least
limited access to those resources, treating the resources as the common
property of the international community. For developed nations, the tradeoff
is between refusing to compromise their intellectual property rights and
technological superiority or sharing useful technologies and assisting in the
economic development of developing nations. Neither article 15 nor article 16
requires the establishment of international agreements for the exchange of
genetic resources for technology, but both of these articles, and the
Biodiversity Treaty as a whole, do require nations to encourage such

See Gollin, supra note 134, at 297.
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agreements. In addition, article 22 explains that this Biodiversity Treaty does
not affect any of the rights or obligations of parties under existing
international agreements addressing intellectual property rights, "except where
the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or
threat to biological diversity."' 44 Most of these existing international
agreements are discussed in 05(A) above.
The United States government has expressed a concern that the technology
sharing provisions of the Biodiversity Treaty may require compulsory
licensing, a practice opposed by the U.S.' 45 Compulsory licensing "enables the
government granting the patent to force the patentee to license the invention
if the government does not approve of the patent's use. Consequently, another
individual or company is allowed to make and sell the invention."' 46
Compulsory licensing is an accepted practice in most of the world's patent
systems, but is entirely rejected only by the U.S. The U.S. has been successful
in incorporating restrictions on compulsory licensing in the recent GATT
negotiations. The Biodiversity Treaty is seen as a potential threat to these
concessions at GATT and as a "slipperly slope" could lead to near extortion
of U.S. companies that do not satisfy the expectations of foreign nations.' 47
For the most part, the biological Treaty promotes free trade in genetic
resources, incentives for the transfer of biotechnology, and the protection of
intellectual property rights which are seen as important in the conservation and
sustainable use of genetic resources. There are many uncertainties and
ambiguities in the text of the Biodiversity Treaty, and it must be viewed as a
starting point for intellectual property rights protection in chemical
prospecting. The Biodiversity Treaty must find its place among other
international agreements addressing intellectual property, many of which are
themselves still in formative stages.

'4

See supra note 117, art. 22(l).
Catherine J. Tinker, Introductionto BiologicalDiversity: Law, Institutions,

SSee

andScience, I BuFF.J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (1994).
146

Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory PatentLicensing in the United States: An Idea

Whose Time Has Come, 8 J. INT'L L. Bus. 666 (1988).
"4 See Richard Stone, The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora'sBox or FairDeal?
Convention on BiologicalDiversity, 256(5064) Scd. 1624 (June 19, 1992).
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The world's biodiversity is concentrated in a very small number of
countries, primarily within the tropics. These dozen or so countries contain
60-70% of the world's terrestrial, freshwater and marine species 148 and have
been referred to as "megadiversity countries" to reflect their high degrees of
endemism, diversity and biological importance.'4 9 The efficacy of chemical
prospecting as a conservation tool in these countries is heavily dependent upon
the state of protection of IPRs in megadiversity nations, and it is here that the
Biodiversity Treaty is playing an important role.

VI. CHALLENGES IN THE PROTECTION OF IPRs
FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

A. PropertyRights andLand Tenure Conditions
Because biodiversity is inextricably tied to the land, IPRs in biological
materials are subject to the property rights and tenure conditions of that land.
The scope of property rights in any nation, and the system by which they are
allocated, affect land use in many ways. Systems in which property rights are
not adequately protected or in which property rights are acquired only through
use often encourage deforestation of the land and the resultant destruction of
biodiversity. 15 °
These countries certainly include, but may not be limited to, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Zaire, Madagascar, Australia, China, India, Indonesia and
Malaysia. See McNEELY ET AL., supra note 6, at 88.
"" See R.A. Mittermeier and T.B. Werner, Wealth of Plants andAnimals Unites
"Megadiversit,"Countries, 4(1) TRoPIcUS 1 (1990).
15 In many nations, such as Brazil, exclusivity over land can only be gained through
logging, ranching or farming the land, all of which involve removal of the natural
biota. Much of this deforestation is done by squaters who are able to gain rights to up
to 100 hectares per person by "using" the land for over one year, gaining title to the
land after five years of continous use and occupancy. Hans P. Binswanger, Brazilian
Policies that Encourage Deforestation in the Amazon, Environment Department
Working Paper no. 16, World Bank 1989. This policy is little more than a specific
application of traditional adverse posession law which has a solid foundation in
148
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Open-access resources' 5 ' are subject to short term competitive
exploitation in which all resource rent value is dissipated without consideration
of long-term value or sustainable use. This form of extraction leads to the
"tragedy of the commons" that Garrett Hardin described as the result of
average value exceeding marginal costs in an open-access resource. 152 There
are a number of reasons for the dissipation of resource value in open-access
resources. First, in the absence of formal property rights, claims to the
resource are limited to claims of use, creating a system which encourages
maximum present utilization of the resource and the dissipation of rental
value. This is the pattern of use that has characterized over-fishing in systems
that fail to protect private property rights in fisheries. The fisheries are
overexploited, often to the point of extreme scarcity, and at the same time
incomes drop as prices drop due to the artificially high supply brought about
by the perverse incentives created by the open-access or common property
conditions.'5 3
Destructive squatters' laws and land tenure conditions in many third world
nations could potentially benefit from and even encourage chemical
prospecting. If chemical prospecting were to be recognized as a valid and
profitable use of land, then it is likely that, in many places, more destructive
resource uses would be abandoned in favor of chemical prospecting as a means
of acquiring title to lands in their natural state. As one source points out,
education and moral suasion have their limited role, but "the economic
American law.
' Resources lacking any form of exclusive fights, as distinguished from common
properly resources in which there are multiple owners where the exclusivity is shared
among the members of a group.
152 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
1
Several studies have examined the effects of property rights on fisheries. Richard
J.Agnello and Lawrence P. Donnelley, Pricesand ProperlyRights in the Fisheries,
42 S.EcoN. J. 253 (1979); G. R. Monroe, Fisheries,ExtendedJurisdiction,and the
Economics of Common Properly Resources, 15 CAN. J. ECON. 405 (1982). The
problem ofoverfishing is of increasing concern, with the last decade bringing the near
exhaustion of many of the world's fisheries, wasting $15 billion-30 billion a year. See
The CatchAbout Fish,The ECoNOMIsT, Mar. 19, 1994, at 13 (citing figures from the
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.)
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approach seeks ways to internalize external diseconomies by compensation,
creating incentives for alternative behavior."'54
It is advantageous for property rights to extend over as large an area as
possible. The costs of securing and protecting small land claims is high due
to poor enforcement, lack of political concern, competing claims and
inefficient private policing.'
Large areas of land could be acquired and
managed by a land trust or similar organization that would then lease portions
of the land out to interested prospectors. Such organizations could also help
facilitate in situ research and conservation activities by permitting the sharing
of costs by multiple prospectors.
B. PatentScope
Most chemical products are not discovered in the same form as they are
marketed. They are derived from other products, through a process of
modification that ranges from moderate alteration to radical transformation.
Somewhere along this continuum lies the point at which an initial chemical A
is altered enough to be considered practically and legally a new, distinct
product- chemical B. This is also the ideal point at which the IPRs held in
chemical A should end and IPRs to chemical B begin.' 56
' Martin T. Katzman and William G. Cale, Jr., TropicalForestPreservation Using
Economic Incentives, 40 Biosci. 827 (1990).
'" In Brazil, the size of land holdings has been highly linked to the security of
property rights in that land, primarily due to economies of scale in the provision of
private policing and the lobbying of local officials. Gary D. Libecap, ProperlyRights,
Rent Dissipation,andEnvironmentalDegradationin the BrazilianAmazon, at 14,
Address at Politi cal Economy Research Center Seminar for Congressional Staff
Members (1991), Lone Mountain Ranch, Big Sky, Montana.
' See PayingforNature'sRiches, 2(4) FOREST PERSPECTrIVES 23 (Winter 1993).
For example, SmithKline Beecham recently derived the semi-synthetic drug topotecan
from camptothecin, a naturally occuring drug found in the plant Camptotheca
acuminata,(Pacific Yew) discovered and developed by the National Cancer Institute
(NCI). It is unclear whether any royalty must be paid to NCI even though significant
additional research and development were required to produce topotecan, and this
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Merely creating chemical B from chemical A does not necessarily mean
that chemical B is not within the umbrella of IPR protection established for
chemical A. At one extreme is mere repackaging. Taking a medicinal agent,
giving it a new name and selling it in new packaging under that brand name is
not the development of a new pharmaceutical. It requires the payment of
royalties to the holder of IPRs in that pharmaceutical, or it is an infringement
on the existing IPRs. It would be unfair to allow such parasitism of another's
efforts and rights without compensation. Even if the pharmaceutical were
chemically altered, but remained functionally and biochemically similar, it
would be unfair to reward the party making the smaller investment and less
significant contribution.
On the other hand, it is essential that the incentives for innovation
provided by IPRs not undermine incentives for further innovation. New
discoveries have a tendency to blossom- multiplying and inspiring further
discoveries, as the full potential and utility of the initial discovery is better
understood and developed. It is important that many parties have the
opportunity to contribute their unique expertise and perspective to the effort
to fuly utilize discoveries in biotechnology. A greater number of minds and
dollars means more progress more quickly, and more benefits to society. Like
many other areas of our legal system, patent scope should be determined by
what is in the interest of public health, safety and welfare.
C. UnfairCompetition andProcessPatents
The recent case Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1738 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) has brought a great deal of attention to the

work was done exclusively by SmithKline, which took advantage of NCI's discov cry.
The argument in favor of limiting NCI's patent to cover only camptothecin is that
compainies like SmithKline would otherwise have no incentive to further the
technology and progress made possible by the initial discovery, and that those who
would suffer are the customers and patients who ultimately benefit from drugs such as
topotecin which has already helped many people abroad.
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issue of unfair trade in products produced or developed using patented
biotechnology processes. Amgen, an American biotech company located in
California, developed a cell which produces high levels of a hormone called
erythropoietin ("EPO"). s7 Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. used Amgen's
genetically-altered, EPO-producing cells to develop a process for producing
recombinant erythropoietin ("rEPO"). Amgen filed a cliam with the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC) for the alleged infringement on
its patent by Chugai, in violation of art. 337 of the Tariff Act,"'8 for producing
rEPO by using Amgen's patented cells. The court interpreted the Tariff Act
narrowly, permitting the import of rEPO, to which Amgen had no claim,
despite the fact that Chugai used Amgen's genetically altered cells to produce
the rEPO.
Amgen clarified the scope of patent protection in biotechnology. The
biological material that one starts with is generally the product of nature, and
thus not patentable, and the end product is usually also found in nature, and
subject to the same restriction. Even the procedures and processes used in
most biotechnology projects are widely known and used and will not meet a
challenge on the grounds of obviousness or novelty. It is only the intermediary
products along the way that are patentable, such as the genetically altered cells
developed by Amgen. Despite this protection, products developed using these
patented intermediaries will be allowed into the U.S. for import, as was the
case in Amgen. The problem for domestic enterprises is apparent- the
competitive advantage of foreign enterprises that piggyback on U.S.
innovations takes money out of the pockets of the American biotech industry.
Critics argue that the court has misread the legislative intent of the Tariff Act
of 1930, and that the same standards should be applied to imported products
as is currently applied to domestic products. 5 9

57 U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008. Amgen's patent claims include purified and isolated
DNA sequences encoding eryth ropoietin as well as host cells transformed or
transfected with a DNA sequence.
158 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
'159
See Viksnins, supranote 71.
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The Process Patent Act'6 attempts to correct this problem, in part. This
law gives the holder of a process patent (to be distinguished from a product
patent in that it protects the means by which a product is produced) to
"exclude others from using or selling throughout the United States, or
importing into the United States, products made by that process.' 6' The
Process Patent Act contains specific remedies for violations involving
products produced abroad using a patented process when those products are
intended for import into the U.S., particularly in personam jurisdiction, as
compared to the in rem exclusion orders previously available from the ITC
under the Tariff Act of 1930.162 Thus, in addition to the intermediary
biological or chemical products produced in the development of biodiversity,
the processes used to create the end product may receive effective international
protection, reducing the number of derivative products or other products
produced using the patented process. This is important because many
processes used in drug development and chemical prospecting will have wide
application and utility in other contexts, and it is important to encourage
development and disclosure of such processes.
D. ProperTiming of IPR Establishment

Chemical prospecting has been compared with the purchase of lottery
tickets, all of which have different potential payoffs, but few of which pay off
at all. 63 The problem is that one can not know whether one has a winning
ticket for quite some time, and possibly may never find out. The timing of the
establishment ofJPRs, therefore, becomes an important issue. Losing tickets
should not be subjected to the expensive and burdensome process of obtaining

"Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563-67; (codified by
35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271,287,295).
6 Id. at 1563.
362 See Mark E. Wojcik, The Perilous Process of Protecting Process Patents from
Infringing Importations, 14 Loy. L.A. INTL. & CoMN. L.J. 207 (1992).
163 Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological
Change, 35 J. LAW ECON. 199, 204 (1992).
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IPRs; winning tickets need to be protected as quickly and effectively as
possible. Even uncertain prospects need to be protected adequately to capture
possible future payoffs.
Ideally, the timing of IPR establishment should be the time of discovery
of a useful application of the biological discovery. The mere discovery of the
chemical or gene is often quite easy when compared to the investment
necessary to find a useful application for the discovery. Changing the timing
in this way would encourage the development of useful applications by
providing the incentive of IPR protection at that point. It is also conceivable
that several levels or classes of IPR protection could be developed to provide
increasing incentives for application. The patent term of 20 years in many
nations may also be an inadequate measure of IPR timing if the clock begins
to run at the time of discovery of the chemical rather than the application,
which may not come along for several years.
The payoffs of chemical prospecting are big. Merck discovered Mevacor,
a cholesterol- lowering agent, in a fungus and sold $735 million of the
chemical in 1990 alone."6 The sale of the anti-cancer drugs Vincristine and
Vinblastine, discovered in the MadagascarPeriwinkle,is estimated at $200
million annually.'
Such enormous payoffs can easily cover the costs of
investment in research, development and conservation incurred in the chemical
prospecting process.
E. Conservation Concerns
Many chemicals are harvested in the wild not in small amounts for study,
but for sale as useful extracts of biological materials. The concept of
extractive reserves has gained increasing popularity in recent years as a
sustainable means of producing such products. Even the chemical prospecting
process itself can require large amounts of raw biological materials, or their
extracts.

'"
165

See Wilson, supranote 9, at 321.
Id.
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Methods of collection of biological materials also have a significant effect
on the sustainability of the extractive process. Many methods of collection
employed today are destructive and result in severe damage or destruction of
the species involved."6 Methods such as stripping too much bark off trees or
removing the roots of plants may be unnecessary or excessive, and are
certainly destructive. Nondestructive methods such as removing a small
portion of the bark of a tree or harvesting leaves are preferable, but are
unfortunately not the common practice, even among local healers. 67
Proper rotations of harvests, maximizing the time between harvests of any
individual plot, can dramatically increase the productivity and long-term
sustainability of the chemical extractive process. 16 It will also assist in the
conservation of biological resources if they are harvested from multiple
locations, possibly involving several nations and if cultivation programs are
established wherever possible to produce the biological materials more
efficiently and intensively. Proper field etiquette and collection techniques
should also be observed, and can be easily learned from materials available
from all major professional scientific organizations.
F. Protectingthe Interests ofIndigenous Peoples
The rights and protection of indigenous peoples was a major concern at
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. There were two dominant perspectives
on indigenous peoples present at the conference, both of which supported
efforts to protect them.' 69 One of these perspectives was an environmental

'6 See Michael J. Balick and Robert Mendelsohn, Assessing the Economic Value
of TraditionalMedicinesFrom TropicalRanforsests, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 128
(1992).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Lee P. Breckenridge, Symposium: EnvironmentalRights and International
Peace:Protectionof Biologicaland CulturalDiversity: Emerging Recogntion of
Local Community Rights in Ecosystems underInternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 59
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focus and was premised on the utility of indigenous peoples in the protection
of biodiversity. The other perspective was cultural and saw the protection of
idigenous peoples as an issue of human rights and cultural diversity. The
former perspective tends to perceive biodiversity as a valuable resource of the
international community held "in trust" by the nation in which it is found,
while the latter views biodiversity as an essential resource of local peoples who
directly utilize biodiversity for their sustenance. 7
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations, an organ of the United
Nations Sub- Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, has produced a Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples which grants indigenous peoples "the right to special
measures for protection, as intellectual property, of their traditional cultural
manifestations, such as... seeds, genetic resources, medicine and knowledge
of the useful properties of fauna and flora.".' Article 80) of the Biodiversity
Convention, as discussed previously, also requires parties to adhere to such
protections of indigenous knowledge. It is likely that indigenous peoples will
have such rights widely recognized, both as a matter of principle and
pragmatics, as indigenous knowledge has been used in the development of
nearly three-quarters of all plant-derived pharmaceutical compounds.' 72
The argument against incorporating indigenous peoples into the chemical

TEN. L. REv. 735 (1992).
170 Id.
17' Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populationson Its Tenth Session,
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
10th Sess., Preambular and Operative Paragraph No. 19 of the Draft Declaration as
agreed upon by the Members of the Working Group at First Reading, Annex I to
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33
(1992).
372 See Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing
Countries, 33 HARv. INT'L L. J. 277, 285 (1992) (The author refers to a number of
recent examples of plant-derived pharmaceutical compounds developed using
traditional knowledge. For example, the skeletal muscle relaxant d-tubocuraine was
used by Amazonian Indians as an arrow poison before its present use in
anesthesiology.)
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prospecting process is that their role is both limited and less effective than
alternative techniques. Much ethnobotanical knowledge has already been
tapped, and while there is certainly more to be found, it becomes more scarce
all the time. Indigenous peoples also have limited knowledge of biodiversity,
great though it may seem in relation to our own. We would be overlooking
many uses of many species if we relied to too great an extent on leads from
indigenous peoples. Scientists from developed countries can simply find more
useful chemicals by utilizing modem chemical screening techniques than they
can by spending their time searching for and following up on ethnobotanical
leads.'
In a free market, it is the efficacy of each technique that will
ultimately determine the extent to which indiginous peoples are brough into
the chemical prospecting process, and at present it seems that companies are
not willing to invest large sums of money in ethnobotanical programs.
G. In situ versus Ex situ Conservation
There are two fundamental approaches to conservation of genetic
resources. The first of these, in situ conservation, operates by preserving
species in their natural habitat by protection the ecosystems in which they are
found. Chemical prospecting is suited to in situ conservation, provided that
an adequate legal environment and technical support structure are present.
When either of these are inadeqate, however, ex situ conservation can be a
valuable alternative.
Ex situ conservation is accomplished through the application of
biotechnological procedures in the laboratory, usually far away from the place
in which the species occur naturally. Ex situ conservation is quite limited in
its applicability, permitting the long term conservation or storage of species
that are either already known or at least discovered. Those species that have
not yet been discovered, along with the numerous species that are dependent
See, statement of Dr. Thomas Eisner in Peter Aldhous, 'HuntingLicense'for
Drugs,353 NATURE 290, Sept. 26, 1991. Eisner points to receptor-molecule-based
screening techniques as the most effective means of biodiversity prospecting, although
he certainly doesn't deny the advantages to be gained from ethnobotany as well.
173
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on natural ecosystems, can only be protected by conserving entire ecosystems.
Furthermore, ex situ conservation is probably ineffective in preserving the
adaptive and neutral evolutionary potential of wild plant populations.' Ex
situ conservation, therefore, is best used as a last resort or necessary substitute
for in situ conservation.
A major problem with ex situ conservation is the North-South conflict it
creates. The technologically and financially rich nations of the North must
import genetic resources from the gene rich, but technologically and financially
poor, nations of the South. An efficient exchange would be technology and
finances from the North in return for genetic resources from the South.
Unfortunately, the South's end of the bargain is rarely as generous as the
North's, making many nations of the South reluctant to engage in ex situ
conservation.

VII. CONCLUSION
Private agreements which create their own version of intellectual property
75

rights, such as the Merck/INBio agreement, will prosper in coming years.

Their effect will parallel in many ways what the Convention on Biological
Diversity has hoped to accomplish. Hopefully, the Convention will work to
encourage chemical prospecting as well as motivate member-states to the
Convention to adopt appropriate national legislation and policy to support
such agreements. What is certain is that incentives matter in the development
of biotechnology and in conservation, and chemical prospecting coupled with
a strong intellectual property framework create a powerful incentive that
accomplishes both these objectives.
The Merck/INBio agreement has shown that chemical prospecting can be

Time to
.of Seed Banks, 8

174See Matthew B. Hamilton, Ex Situ Conservationof Wild PlantSpecies:

Reassess the Genetic Assumptions andImplications
BIOLOGY 39 (1994).
CONSERVATION
7

'See Thomas Eisner and Elizabeth A. Beiring, Biotic Exploration FundProtectingBiodiversity Through ChemicalProspecting,44(2) Biosci. 95, 97 (1994).
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profitable both to the developed countries who often initiate such activity, and
to biodiversity-rich developing countries that control the resources to make it
possible. While it's true that by providing heightened IPR protection,
developing countries permit technology and capital-rich developed nations to
protect the vast majority of discoveries that end up in their hands, developed
nations can share in much of the value created by these IPRs. The benefits in
both the short and long term of this economic activity can outweigh even the
limited but substantial opportunities for piracy existing without adequate IPR
enforcement. Those nations that are able to recognize these benefits are
certain to attract the interest and investment of corporations that will not only
share their prosperity, but will even seek solutions to problems specific to
those nations.
A number of conditions must exist to support chemical prospecting in any
location. The most important of these is a clearly-defined and well-enforced
property rights structure. Better- defined intellectual property rights need to
be developed, preferably with specific reference to the type of biotechnological
research coupled with the chemical prospecing process. Such issues as patent
scope, proper timing of IPR establishment, and protection of the processes
used in conducting biotechnology research and development must be dealt
with. It must be determined to what extent indigenous peoples will be
incorporated into the prospecting process, and what portion of the process, and
also conservation, will be conducted in situ.
IPRs can be both an incentive and a potential problem for the conservation
ofbiodiversity. On the one hand, IPRs make the discovery of new chemicals
and genes more valuable because of the potential benefits that can be realized
by exclusive rights to the profit from such discoveries. On the other hand, the
process by which one obtains a patent for a useful natural product may cause
excessive harvesting and destruction of the species for research and
development purposes. Additionally, IPRs may not be enough for
conservation; a greater, general property interest in the source of the natural
product may be necessary to realize any of the value of the IPRs. Such
questions, as IPRs in products of nature, will force us to consider this and
many other issues such as sustainable development, international law, and the
role of intemational private agreements in achieving multinational objectives.

